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t no time in the Philippines’ recent history has
its fiscal position been the subject of so much
intense debate and concern as it is today. In-
deed, the country’s fiscal position has very well
reached crisis proportion, something that has accumu-
lated through a certain period of time and something
that many fiscal economists have been forewarning for
years now.
Where are we now?
The Philippines had a fairly long period of fiscal consoli-
dation during most of the 1990s when the national gov-
ernment fiscal position improved from a deficit of 3.5
percent of GDP in 1990 to surpluses of less than 1 per-
cent of GDP in 1994-1997 (Figure 1). Said fiscal sur-
pluses, however, turned into deficits following the onset
of the Asian financial crisis. And despite the turnaround
in the economy, these deficits grew persistently from 1.9
percent of GDP in 1998 to 4.1 percent in 2000, to 5.3
percent of GDP in 2002 and 4.6 percent of GDP in 2003.
In more recent years, the fiscal problem was aggravated
by policy mistakes such as the legislative inaction on the
rationalization of fiscal incentives and the incomplete
implementation, due to the nonissuance of requisite IRRs,
of what was originally planned to be a comprehensive tax
reform program. In addition, the lack of corrective mea-
sures, even when the need for such appears to be obvi-
ous, e.g., nonindexation of excise taxes, added to the
problem. It is also lamentable that the quality of fiscal
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Figure 1. Fiscal aggregates (cash basis), 1990-2003
(percent of GDP)August 2004 2
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1 Thailand registered the largest fiscal deficit in the region in
1997-1999 while Malaysia posted the highest fiscal deficit in 2000-
2001. During this period, however, the Philippines had the second
largest fiscal deficit amongst ASEAN countries.
adjustment has been poor, relying heavily
as it did on across-the-board budget cuts.
Consequently, national government (NG)
debt rose from 56 percent of GDP in 1997
to 65 percent in 2000. With the higher fis-
cal deficit in 2002, NG debt increased
some more to 71 percent of GDP in 2002
and 77 percent in 2003 (Figure 2). If con-
tingent liabilities were included, NG debt
is seen to have risen from 86 percent of
GDP in 2000 to 93 percent in 2003.
From a crosscountry perspective, the Phil-
ippines’ fiscal deficit, when measured rela-
tive to GDP, may not be the highest in the
region in the period after the Asian finan-
cial crisis;1 however, the country had always
outranked the other countries in terms of
the size of its national government debt
(Figure 3). In this sense, then, the Philip-
pines is more vulnerable than the other
countries in the region to fluctuations in
interest rate and foreign exchange rate. It
is therefore not surprising that the interna-
tional credit community has started to show
some concern. Philippine sovereign bond
spreads were one of the highest in the re-
gion in 2002-2003 (Figure 4) and some
reports indicate that the Philippine bond
spreads in April 2004 were even higher
than that of Pakistan for the first time in
Philippine history.
What explains the growing fiscal
deficit?
Total national government expenditures
have remained stable at around 19.4 percent of GDP in 1997-2003, notwithstanding mounting interest payments
(which rose from 3.2% in 1997 to 4.3% in 2000 and to
5.2% in 2003). In contrast, the national government’s
revenue effort declined persistently from 19.4 percent
of GDP in 1997 to 15.6 percent in 2000. The ratio of NG
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Figure 3. Fiscal balance and outstanding debt of the central
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2002 before recovering slightly to 14.4 percent in 2003
(Figure 5). Thus, the increase in the fiscal deficit may
largely be attributed to the deterioration of the national
government’s revenue effort.
The erosion of the revenue effort in the Philippines is
attributed largely to the weakening of the tax effort, al-
beit the fact that nontax revenues also dipped. Overall
tax effort in the Philippines plummeted from a peak of
17.0 percent of GDP in 1997 to 13.9 percent in 2000
and further down to 12.3 percent in 2002 (Figure 6).
About two-thirds of the contraction was due to the reduc-
tion in the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) tax effort
while the remainder was attributable to the reduction in
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) tax effort.
While the fall in BOC revenue from 3.9 percent of GDP in
1997 to 2.9 percent in 2000 and 2.6 percent in 2001
may be attributed largely to the tariff reduction program,
its further decline to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2002 and
2003 appears to be due to problems with smuggling
(Manasan 2003).2 On the other hand, BIR revenues
dropped from 13.0 percent of GDP in 1997 to 10.9 per-
cent in 2000 and 9.8 percent in 2002 due to problems
with both tax policy (i.e., decline in effective income tax
rates and nonindexation of sin and petroleum product
taxes) and tax administration.3 It should be stressed that
the contraction in BIR tax effort resulting from the change
in tax policy in 1996/1997 is not a one-off change but
has been growing over time. In particular, it is estimated
that BIR tax effort declined by about 0.16 of a percent-
age point yearly on the average in 1997-2003 due to the
nonindexation of excise taxes.
Meanwhile, the improvement in the national government
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Figure 4. Philippine bond spreads as one of the highest
in the region
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Figure 5. Fiscal aggregates (cash basis), 1990-2003
(percent of GDP)
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Figure 6. Overall tax effort
________________
2 It should be noted that tariff rates have been frozen at their
2001 levels in 2002 and 2003.
3 In particular, 46 percent of the 2.3 percentage point decline in
BIR tax effort between 1997-2001 is attributable to changes in tax
policy (notably the reduction in effective tax rates for the income tax
and the excise tax due to nonindexation), another 46 percent to in-
creased evasion and only 7 percent to changes in economic struc-
ture. On the average, BIR tax effort declined by 0.23 percentage
point of GDP every year between 1997 and 2001 due to the
nonindexation of sin and petroleum product taxes (Manasan 2002).August 2004 4
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positive attention it has received to date. Still, the im-
provement in the BIR tax effort in 2003, when compared
with its 2002 level, may be considered to be slight and it
is the improvement in its collection efficiency that is more
significant (Table 1).4 This underscores the fact that be-
cause of problems in tax structure, BIR tax administra-
tion has to continually improve in order for the BIR to
maintain its tax effort. In other words, without changes
in tax policy, the BIR has to run just to keep in place.
With regard to expenditure, the program in 1998-2003 is
characterized by its undue reliance on expenditure cuts.
The delivery of many public services during the period
continues to be at risk because many government agen-
cies have had to work with budgets that have either been
reduced in nominal pesos or have grown at a slower pace
than the rate of inflation. Consequently, real per capita
spending on social services continues to go down (Table
2) and the financing gap for the attainment of the Millen-
nium Development Goals persists to widen. At the same
time, government infrastructure investments remain se-
verely underfunded, thereby adversely affecting the
country’s competitiveness.
Looking for the complete fiscal picture
It is not, however, enough to focus on the fiscal position
of the national government. What is even more impor-
tant is to look at the complete fiscal picture by examin-
ing more closely the consolidated public sector deficit.
The fiscal deficit of nonfinancial public sector has been
rising rather steeply since 1996, from 0.6 percent to 6.7
percent of GDP in 2002. The fiscal position of the nonfi-
nancial public sector is projected to worsen some more
to 7.6 percent of GDP in 2003 and 7.2 percent of GDP in
2004 (Figure 7). Consequently, outstanding debt of the
nonfinancial public sector expanded persistently from
75.4 percent of GDP in 1996 to 103.4 percent of GDP in
2002 and 105.0 percent as of end of September 2003
(Figure 8).
From 1996-1999, this trend was largely on account of
the national government. From 2000-2004, however,
government-owned and/or controlled corporations
(GOCCs) have become the primary culprit in the deterio-
rating fiscal position of the nonfinancial public sector even
as the deficit of the CB-BOL has started to taper off (re-
fer back to Figure 7).
Following the government corporate sector reform that
was started in the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit of the 14
________________
4 Nonetheless, said improvement in collection efficiency is not
sufficient for the BIR to equal its performance level in 2001.
2003 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Actual Projection based Projection based
  on 2001 on 2002
Collection Efficiency  Collection Efficiency
  
Total Revenue 18.90 19.44 17.35 16.07 15.34 15.52 14.32 14.81
 
Tax revenue 16.94 16.98 15.63 14.50 13.71 13.49 12.54 12.70
of which:
 BIR 12.01 12.97 12.65 11.47 10.76 10.70 9.96 10.06 10.27 9.84
 BOC 4.81 3.91 2.85 2.91 2.83 2.65 2.43 2.51 2.65 2.43
 
Nontax revenue 1.96 2.46 1.72 1.57 1.63 2.03 1.78 2.11
of which:
 Fees/Charges 0.54 0.54 0.79 0.54 0.55 0.67 0.55 0.44 0.67 0.55
 BTr  Income 1.13 1.46 0.85 0.88 0.91 1.28 1.19 1.34 1.20 1.20
  
aBased on July 2004 National Income Accounts data
Table 1. National Government revenue efforta (percent of GDP)No. 2004-07 5
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GOCCs was less than 1 percent of GDP for most of the
1990s. However, serious problems have re-emerged start-
ing in 1998 when the fiscal deficit of the 14 GOCCs surged
to 1.4 percent of GDP
from the 0.7 percent
level in the previous year.
Although the aggregate
fiscal position of these
GOCCs has been kept in
check until 1999, it has
consistently weakened in
more recent years, with
the 2002 deficit reaching
1.2 percent of GDP.
Moreover, the combined
deficit of the GOCC sec-
tor is projected to rise to 2.4 percent of
GDP in 2003 and 2.5 percent of GDP in
2004.
What brought about such situation?
The problems ailing these GOCCs are com-
mon to many of them. Although generally
viewed as entities that are akin to private
enterprises in the sense that they produce
private goods (as opposed to pure public
goods), government ownership has been
justified on the basis of some market fail-
ure like the presence of natural monopo-
lies (e.g., power generation and transmis-
sion). Moreover, many of the GOCCs are
assigned special developmental roles like
the provision of public infrastructure ser-
vices that the private sector may be reluc-
tant to supply given their large investment
costs and the associated uncertain and
long gestation periods.
Many of these GOCCs, however, suffer
from poor cost recovery due to inadequate
tariff adjustments. Political interference
in tariff setting, often in response to popu-
list clamor, prevents them from increasing their prices to
address rising costs such as in the case of the National
Power Corporation (NPC). In the case of other GOCCs,
Figure 7.  Non-financial Public Sector Deficit





























































































Non-Financial Public Sector National Govt. Deficit 
Monitored GOCCs Deficit CB Restructuring
Figure 7. Nonfinancial public sector deficit (as percent of GDP)
Figure 8. Outstanding Non-Financial Public Sector Debt

























































































Non-Financial Public Sector National Government Mon i tor ed  GOCCs
Figure 8. Outstanding nonfinancial public sector debt
(as percent of GDP)
Table 2. Real per capita National Government expenditures on social services,
1996-2004 (2000 prices)
          
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Prel Pres
Total social services 2,188 2,487 2,417 2,323 2,302 2,035 2,022 2,016 1,999
Education 1,534 1,789 1,761 1,675 1,608 1,516 1,505 1,455 1,412
Health 230 266 221 223 202 166 171 151 141
Social security, welfare
and employment 317 392 387 364 376 331 327 392 418
Housing and community
development 107 39 48 61 115 22 19 19 29August 2004 6
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government’s subvention policy itself dictates that the
prices they charge should be lower than what the cost
recovery principle calls for. Examples of this may be seen
in the case of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
since the time of the Estrada administration, and the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
which does not charge for raw water yet finances the
development of the water source.
Meanwhile, the large fiscal deficits of still other GOCCs
are linked with the contingent liabilities that they have
earlier contracted such as in the case of the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Home Guaranty Corpora-
tion (HGC). In addition, because of the poor incentive
structure in the public sector, some of these GOCCs are
afflicted with a poor record in collecting fees while oth-
ers are overstaffed. By and large, many of them are
saddled with a large debt stock which further aggravates
their already weak fiscal positions.
Of the 14 monitored GOCCs, the most notable in terms
of their contribution to the deficit are the NPC, MWSS,
LRTA, NIA, HGC and the National Food Authority (NFA). In
2000-2002, the NPC accounted for some 37 percent of
the total GOCC deficit, the NFA, 14 percent, the LRTA,
13 percent, the HGC, 8 percent and the MWSS, 6 per-
cent. In 2003-2004, the bulk (77%-78%) of the deficit is
attributable to the NPC.
Where do we want to go?
Certainly, the overall fiscal picture calls for immediate
action. There is widespread agreement among experts
and practitioners that improving the public sector’s fis-
cal position is the most critical challenge that the coun-
try faces today. And not to adequately address the wid-
ening fiscal gap now will lead to even further increases
in the fiscal deficit as public debt continues to mount
and interest payments continue to grow.
But how do we go about addressing it? Four major areas
of reform are hereby being recommended to immediately
be placed on top of the agenda. On the revenue side,
reforms must focus on both tax policy and tax adminis-
tration, and must be undertaken in tandem with one an-
other. On the expenditure side, public expenditure man-
agement reforms must be put into place. And finally, spe-
cific GOCC reforms must be adopted. These suggested
reforms are discussed lengthily in the Policy Notes that
follows after this.      
Bibliography
Manasan, R.G. 2003. Tax administration reform: (semi-) autono-
mous revenue authority anyone? PIDS Discussion Paper
Series No. 2003-05. Makati, Philippines: Philippine Insti-
tute for Development Studies.
Medalla, F. 2004. Some questions on public debt. Presentation
made to the Philippine Economic Society Annual Member-
ship Meeting held on May 26, 2004 at the De La Salle Uni-
versity.
For further information, please contact
The Research Information Staff
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, 1229 Makati City
Telephone Nos: 892-4059 and 893-5705
Fax Nos: 893-9589 and 816-1091
E-mail: rmanasan@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph; jliguton@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph
The Policy Notes series is available online at http://www.pids.gov.ph.
Reentered as second class mail at the Business Mail Service Office
under Permit No. PS-570-04 NCR. Valid until December 31,
2004.
There is widespread agreement among experts
and practitioners that improving the public
sector’s fiscal position is the most critical
challenge that the country faces today. And
not to adequately address the widening fiscal
gap now will lead to even further increases
in the fiscal deficit as public debt continues
to mount and interest payments continue to
grow.